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ABSTRACT 
Purpose of this paper 
The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on the issue of the effect on public enterprises 
economic performance of the introduction of some given changes in organisational status and 
management practices, while keeping the enterprises under public control.  
Approach 
Our approach is case study type and relies on comparative efficiency literature. We identify relevant 
changes on the organisational status of a State owned large hotel group along a period of twenty years, 
next we measure its annual efficiency indicators, and then evaluate to which extent the observed changes 
in economic performance can be attributable to the corresponding management reforms carried out.  
Findings 
As a result we find that the formally more relevant change in organisational status (the enterprise passing 
to be a Limited Company), which implied a substantial increase in the enterprise autonomy, did not 
produce a significant improvement in its economic performance; a finding contrary to what we expected 
according to agency theory. However, a second relevant organisational change –five years later- when 
both the principal (government) and the agent (firm’s CEO) changed is consistently related to a 
significant improvement in economic performance.  
Research implication 
As a research implication we abide for use more precise agency theory statements; and as a  practical 
implication we argue here that potentialities of improvement brought about by a formal-legal change in 
the status of the enterprise may require  also –in order to actually improve firm’s efficiency-  some 
changes in the firm’s key personal positions: supervisor (principal) and CEO (agent), in the sense that a 
change to a greater-autonomy  for the enterprise it seems should come together a parallel new 
‘management culture’.     
Practical implications 
Management good practises to apply to other public enterprise’s restructuring in order to improve their 
efficiency. 
Original paper 
It’s the first study on organizational changes and efficiency for an important Spanish public enterprise. 
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Organisational status and efficiency: The case of the Spanish SOE ‘Paradores’ 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The research we summarise here has a basic aim of providing more evidence on the 
issue of  the effect on public enterprise (PE) economic performance of the introduction 
of changes in organisational status and management practices, while keeping the 
enterprises under public control. That is, how far the ‘management-improvement’ 
reforms applied to PE actually generate improvements in their efficiency. Our study is 
of an in-depth case study type, and refers to the only Spanish public hotel group: 
Paradores Nacionales. It is a fully state-owned enterprise, and it has experienced 
several changes in its organisational status. It operates under competition conditions, 
that is, under the same conditions prevailing for the other Spanish (private) hotel chains. 
There is not specific regulation on the sector.   
As changes in the organisational status of a PE we consider here, 1) significant changes 
in the legal status of the PE, towards more company independence (Parker / Hartley, 
1991), and 2)  that  restructuring measures in the PE’s have been undertaken, in the 
sense of changing its organisational structure and introducing new ways of management 
and/or new ways of reporting & supervision. All these changes and restructuring being 
oriented to allow for more autonomy in the PE, and to introduce management rules and 
objectives explicitly oriented to financial results; that is, market oriented criteria. These 
kinds of measures are usually referred to as: ‘to introduce private-company-type 
management criteria, objectives and practices into a PE’; or as to ‘commercialise’ the 
public corporation (Bozec / Dia, 2003); or, also, as ‘organisational privatisation’. In any 
case the objective pursued by the government by undertaking these reform/modernising 
policies is clear: to try to improve PE efficiency without choosing the option of 
privatising them.  
Direct empirical evidence on efficiency improvements yielded by these types of 
changes in organisational status is at present not extensive; partially because in most 
cases these reforms come together with changes in the market position of the PE (eg. 
market liberalisation,) or in the regulation on the sector (Hartley / Parker/ Martin, 1991), 
which makes it difficult to determine the specific effect on efficiency attributable to the 
organisational reforms per se. And, on the other hand, in-depth case studies (which 
seems a logical approach to analyse these kinds of questions) are not abundant (Curwen, 
1988; Aylen, 1999; Beauman, 1996). Nevertheless, we can also count on some indirect 
empirical evidence on our issue. Thus, the significant efficiency improvements reported 
in several studies for the period prior to some PE privatisation (Lynk, 1993; Martin and 
Parker, 1997; Dewenter / Malatesta, 2001, p. 321; Reeves and Palcic, 2004) tend to be 
explained precisely in terms of an effect coming from organisational reforms (oriented 
to financial targets and the other private-like management practices) introduced by the 
government into the PE during the pre-privatisation period. We can also add to this 
indirect evidence, that provided by studies that detect efficiency improvements in the 
remaining state-owned enterprises, in parallel to the privatisation process of other SOE; 
i.e., cases where the efficiency of firms –both, privatised and not privatised- improves to 
a similar degree during the same period  (Majumdar, 1998, pp. 17-18; Omran, 2004). 
And we also have as a related issue the empirical evidence provided by those studies 
that find no significant differences in efficiency in some PE operating without political 
constraints, compared to similar private enterprises (Kole / Mulherin, 1997).  
Starting from that background, our case study  aims at providing direct empirical 
evidence on the relationship between the ‘organisational privatisation’-type reforms and 
the degree of efficiency of the affected PE.  
 
2. APPROACH 
The direct government intervention on the firm, that consists in the case of “Paradores” 
in the government deciding –through a public agency: ‘Turespaña’- the sites and 
buildings for every “Paradores”’ hotel, as part of government regional development 
policy. However, we have verified that no significant change in this constraint has 
occurred during the period of our study, so, there is no need to take this issue into 
account in our analysis either.  
Therefore, our study my be centred on identifying the moments of change in the 
organisational status of “Paradores”, to assess the firm’s efficiency for each year of the 
study period, and to determine the relationship that can be established between both 
elements; that is, what the impact of this organisational changes on efficiency has been. 
Taking into account, when evaluating this observed relationship, the external economic 
background for the same years:  general economic trends and, specifically, the evolution 
of demand for hotel services .  
 
2.1 Defining changes in organisational status 
To typify those changes in organisational status that may affect a company’s efficiency 
we rely both on agency theory and on management control literature. From the first we 
take the idea that when the ‘principal’ (government, in our case) gives more autonomy 
to the enterprise management (CEO; the ‘agent’) then the corresponding fiduciary 
agency costs will be lower; and, therefore, enterprise efficiency will increase. And we 
also assume the proposition that the more effective the control the principal exerts on 
company’s management, (supervision system and practise) the more effort the 
agent/management will put in, so bringing a reduction in efficiency agency costs. On 
the other hand, the ‘best practices’ literature on management control tells us that the 
effectiveness of a control system on a firm’s manager will depend basically on 
appropriate compliance  by the principal of three related practical conditions: 1) annual 
specific targets within the context of long term objectives must be set for the manager of 
the firm. 2) Short term  comparison of targets vs. actual results should be carried out. 3) 
Some kind of incentive for the manager is established, linked to the above comparison 
of results/targets.  
Taking the above methodological approach, in the present study we have tried to 
characterise (identify) the relevant changes in the organisational status of the firm 
addressing the following questions:  a) Degree of autonomy (range of decision power) 
for the enterprise manager (CEO); b) Basic features of the supervision/control system & 
practices; i.e., strategic planning practice, type of annual targets set for the firm 
manager, and periodical reporting & control scope and procedures; c) Incentive scheme 
for the enterprise manager; d) actual enterprise management practices and strategic 
decisions.  
2.2 Efficiency measurement approach 
To measure a firm’s economic performance we use three indicators: two measures of 
financial results, and a productivity index. That is, we work with ordinary operating 
revenues (OR) and operating costs (OC).  Then we calculate the margin rate over 
revenues as our basic financial performance indicator:  
m = 
OR
OP ;  being:  OP=Operating Profits = Operating Revenues (OR) – Operating Costs (OC)  
which we use together with the rate of return on investment  
r = 
FLE
OP
+ ;  where: E=Equity;  FL = Financial Liabilities 
In using these two performance measures we take into account that they are not 
independent variables but linked through a well known relationship:  
r=m⋅[OR/(E+FL)]. Considering this we can say that, especially in the event the two 
variables should lead to disparate conclusions, the first (m) will be more significant as 
an efficiency measure, as it comes from confronting in a given way the monetary 
figures of outputs with those of inputs; while variable r depends on variable m and on 
variable [OR/(E+FL)] which has more to do with the firm’s financial structure 
(revenues per monetary unit of investment) than with the firm’s efficiency per se..  
As for a productivity measure, we use the standard total factor productivity index (TFP),  
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where: qi are the quantities of the  ‘i’ outputs; Pi are the prices obtained by the firm for every one; Fj 
stand for the quantities of the ‘j’ inputs; Kj stand for the prices paid by the firm for each input; ‘x’ 
stands for the year for which we are determining the productivity; ‘0’ stands for the specific year we 
take as reference for the change in prices; PIx,0i are the price-change index for output ‘i’, from year 0 
to year x; and KIx.0j are the corresponding price-change index for input j. 
And we complement the former with its annual rate of growth, t = ln(Πx/Πx-1). 
As usual, the key issue for the calculation of the above productivity index for every year 
x is how outputs and inputs are measured and how price changes are determined or 
estimated. As regards outputs, the data obtained have allowed us to distinguish three 
types of outputs: lodging, food and beverages, and other complimentary services. For 
each of these three activities we have been able to determine the respective annual 
revenues (ORxi), whose relative importance is remarkably constant over the period 
studied: 48.5 %, 47%, and 4.5%, respectively; (the differences between one year and 
another do not exceed one percentage point). We have also obtained the physical units 
associated with the two main activities: number of room-days invoiced (as lodging 
units), and number of covers served (as food and beverage units). This has allowed us to 
calculate the average annual prices applied by the enterprise for lodging and for food 
and beverages, respectively. Both temporal series of prices have been translated into 
their respective indices of variation (taking year 1992 as a base; the first year we have 
been able to obtain complete data). Finally for the other 4.5% of revenues we have 
supposed that the evolution of the enterprise’s prices has been equal to the weighted 
average of the two main blocks of revenues; thereby completing three series of indices 
of variation for the enterprise’s prices (PIix,92 ).  It has not been necessary to resort to the 
usual estimations based on indices of external prices.   
This has not been the case for inputs. As is usual in applications dealing with total 
productivity, the information available has not allowed us to determine the average 
purchasing or contracting prices paid by the enterprise to the many different factors 
(which are in any case very diverse in a hotel company); nor, therefore, to produce the 
corresponding indices of variation of prices paid by the enterprise to its factors. Hence 
we have here followed the usual practice of making estimations based on indices of 
external prices (from annual statistics) to determine the values KIjx,0 . The information 
obtained on the enterprise’s costs has allowed us to distinguish five blocks of factors: 
Personnel, Consumables, Depreciation, External Services and Other. As indices of 
external prices we have taken: for Personnel the annual indices of the Gazette of Labour 
Statistics; for Consumables (different material for rooms, food products, beverages, ..), 
the Food and Beverage RPI; for Depreciation the RPI for durable industrial goods; for 
External Services the RPI for Other Services; and for other costs the general RPI. (all 
taken from the National Institute of Statistics, INE) .  
 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Identification of relevant changes in the “Paradores” organisational status 
Following the approach described in 2.1, we have analysed “Paradores”’ successive 
legal-status and internal organisation changes during the period 1985-2004. To do so, 
we have relied on annual company reports, related ministry reports, and on in-depth 
interviews with former and present “Paradores”’ managers. As a result we have 
identified the following relevant changes in organisational status:  
(take in Table I) 
According to the above analysis, we conclude that we can distinguish three relevant 
moments of change in the organisational status: 
1. (1991) The separation of “Paradores” from the Ministerial structure, and its 
change of legal personality as a limited liability company.  
2. (1996) Changes in the company and its relationship with the government, as a 
consequence of the change in government (the Socialist Party loses power and 
the Popular Party takes over).  
3.  (2004) As above, in this case the Socialist Party wins. In addition the 
“Paradores” management is able to decide on the location of new hotels. 
However, as we do not have enough information available for the period after the last 
organisational change to analyse any possible changes in efficiency attributable to these, 
we have only considered the first two changes; that is we have analysed three sub 
periods: 1985-1990, 1992-1995, and 1997-2003.  
 
3.2 Efficiency measurements and explanatory variables 
Basic variables for efficiency measurement have been produced –according to what is 
stated above- working on primary data from company annual reports. From this 
database we have calculated the efficiency indicators described in point 2.. The results 
are shown in Table II. 
(take in Table II) 
 
Finally to determine if there has effectively been a relation of cause and effect between 
the changes in organisational status and variations observed in company efficiency we 
have carried out a multilateral comparison –using the three efficiency indicators- of the 
respective average values, before and after the two organisational changes (table III). 
(take in Table III) 
 
We can see, therefore, that the change in organisational status when the enterprise 
changed legally into a Limited Company had a negative impact on economic indicators: 
an average reduction of over 5 points in the margin rate (statistically significant). A 
result in contrast to what we expected according to our initial hypothesis based on  that 
such a change in legal personality would imply a higher degree of autonomy for 
company management and this greater autonomy would be reflected in an improvement 
in economic indicators. This may be partly explained by 1) the fact that the pace of 
growth of the activity of the hotel sector decreased notably from one period to the other, 
after 1991, as a consequence of the general economic crisis caused by the Gulf war 
(1991). And the dynamics of “Paradores” evolved in a similar way (columns 6 and 7 
and table II); and 2) the organisational change of 1991 was actually purely legal, and did 
not result in changes in the managing of the company, as we conclude from an in-depth 
analysis (based on interviews with company managers), and as is shown in our  
synopsis in table I, in the section ‘impact on management policy’. 
And in contrast, the second organisational change –in which both the principal and the 
agent (CEO) change as a consequence of the change in government- is associated with a 
substantial improvement in economic indicators: an average increase of 8 points in the 
margin rate; three more than had been lost in the previous period. However, in terms of 
productivity the improvement is rather more modest:  9%. From the difference between 
these two increases we can deduce that the improvement in margin after this second 
change was due in part to the increase in productivity but, above all, to an increase in 
billing prices much higher than purchasing/contracting prices. It must be pointed out 
that  this improvement in financial results happened along a period where a recovery in 
the pace of growth of the output of “Paradores” occurred, in line with the recovery of 
the sector. Though it appears clear from our analysis that also  significant changes in 
management policy within the company took place after this second organisational 
change (table I, second section); as if the potentialities of the greater autonomy brought 
about by the first organisational change (1991) did not become effective until the 
second one (1996). 
As we can see, coinciding with both organisational changes an important variation in 
activity level both in the sector and in “Paradores” occurred. How far can the changes 
observed in efficiency indicators between one sub-period and another be considered 
due, totally or partially, to factors which were external to the supervision and 
management of the company such as the economic situation of the sector? To control 
for  this external factor, on the one hand we have analysed how far the annual variations 
in the company revenues (OR) correlate with the variation in demand in the hotel sector 
in Spain. And on the other hand we have measured  the sensitivity of productivity (TFP) 
to such relative variations in annual company revenues.  
As regards the first relationship (column (6) vs. column (7) in table II), the result 
obtained (by means of a regression using o.l.s.) allows us to state that, effectively, the 
correlation is very high: Around 80% of the relative variation in “Paradores”’s turnover 
is explained by the evolution of the economic situation in the sector. And with reagard 
to  the sensitivity of the productivity (column 3) with respect to this growth in 
“Paradores” output (growth in real terms, column 5), we have found (using the same 
technique) that the usual working hypothesis that an increase (decrease) in the level of 
real activity will lead to in the short term –due to the existence of fixed costs- an 
increase (decrease) in the relationship outputs / inputs, is true in this case with respect to 
the indicator of total productivity. From this quantitive analysis –connecting the two 
above results- we  conclude, that of the increase observed in productivity after the 
second organisational change (+0,0923), approximately half can be attributed to the 
effect of strong growth in the activity level of the company; that is to a certain type of 
economies of scale; albeit  such output growth for “Paradores” comes explained mostly  
by the growth in demand in the Spanish hotel sector. Hence, for the improvement 
observed in productivity for “Paradores” (9%) about the other half can be actually  
attributed to the organisational changes in 1996.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
We have tried to verify in this work how changes in the organisational status of the state 
enterprise ‘Paradores’ have affected its degree of efficiency. From the study carried out 
we conclude that during the analysed period, 1985-2004,  “Paradores” experienced three 
relevant changes in its organisational status: in 1991, in 1996 and in 2004. However, we 
only analyse here the first two, as there are not yet enough data for the last one.  
Our results point to the fact that the first apparently relevant change (1991), which made 
the enterprise going from being a ministerial agency to being a Limited Company was 
purely formal, as while the enterprise changed its legal status, and the whole formal 
structure necessary for more management autonomy was established, none of this 
materialised in internal management’s specific actions or policies. Thus,  –and even 
controlling for the role that the unfavourable economic situation played just after 1991 – 
in this case the standard hypothesis that a change in firm’s organisational status towards 
more autonomy with respect to government intervention will translate into higher 
company efficiency is not confirmed. A finding that suggests the convenience of a more 
precise formulation of agency theory where applying to PE, distinguishing between 
changes in status that allow for more enterprise autonomy, on the one hand, and 
effective use of this possibility by managers on the other. 
In contrast, the second relevant organisational change here analysed, 1996, when both 
principal and agent (CEO) changed, appears to really be an effective management 
reform; new inside management techniques were applied, and specific strategies aimed 
at improving quality and management practices are adopted. And we observe, in 
parallel,  a strong favourable change in efficiency indicators: productivity increases 
moderately but the margin rate shows a large increase, reaching high positive levels. 
However, this impressive improvement in economic performance was not so much due 
to an increase in company productivity but mainly to 1) a relative increase in billing 
prices and 2) an improvement in the economic situation of the Spanish hotel sector.   
Nevertheless, we can say that in this case the change of both principal and agent seems 
to have been a determining factor to put into effect the possibilities of more enterprise 
autonomy which were established five years earlier.  
To sum up, the above conclusions suggest that in future studies on the effect of 
management reforms on the economic performance of public enterprises more attention 
should be paid to the fact that a certain period of time may be required for the 
potentialities that a particular reform  may offer become effective; and that one of the 
fostering conditions for this effectiveness may be the firm’s key position, specially the 
CEO, be actually prepared to change accordingly as far as the ways of managing and 
running the firm.  
--- 
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Table I 
Assessment of the relevant changes in organisational status 
Formal change Relevant changes observed in the organization  Assessment 
1991. Change of 
legal personality: 
the enterprise 
becomes a Limited 
Liability Company 
with 100% of the 
shares in the hands 
of the State.  
Degree of autonomy:  
1.A hierarchical structure based in territorial divisions is 
established  
Control system:  
2. 4-year strategic plans are introduced with the establishment of 
annual targets and management supervision by means of budget 
control. Annual accounts and budgets are started 
System of incentives:  
3. All managers below top management receive a variable 
remuneration (which could reach 30%) depending on achieving 
targets. 
Impact on management policies
4. Setting up of the first staff training plans 
Increase  
notable  
 
 Improvement  
substantial 
  
 
 
Increase  
(introduced for the first 
time)  
 
Irrelevant 
Specific action is not 
taken to back up the 
change in organisational 
status 
1996.  Change in 
the national 
government and 
consequent changes 
in political control 
and management 
staff over enterprise 
management.   
Degree of autonomy:  
1. Regional mangers go from 10 to 4. 
Control system:   
2. Change of Chairman/CEO. 
3. Substitution of 73% of the members of the Board. 
4. Substitution of all the General Managers 
System of incentives:  
5. The variable remuneration plan is extended to the heads of 
department of company establishments. A policy of special prices 
and discounts is applied in all establishments for staff. 
Impact on management policies:  
6. A new marketing plan is initiated, a plan to update 
establishments and a plan to computerise the enterprise. 
7. Adoption of quality rules and controls, adoption of the TQ 
philosophy and Continuous Improvement. 
8. The “Amigos de Paradores” loyalty programme is launched. 
9. A Professional Career Plan is launched for staff. Beginning of 
the first strategic continuous training plan for staff 
Decrease  
 
Change of ‘principal’ 
Change of ‘agent’ 
 
 
Increase,  
As it is extended to lower 
management 
 
Substantial 
Introduction of numerous 
measures and specific 
actions that allow for 
effective “organisational 
privatisation” 
2000. After the Degree of autonomy:  Minor changes 
General elections 
the party in power 
continues with an 
absolute majority. 
1. Half of the General managers are changed. 
Control system:   
2. Change of Chairman/CEO and 75% of Board members  
System of incentives:  
3. Staff recognition is initiated by means of various types of 
awards: for quality, for billing and for management. 
Impact on management policies: 
4. An Environmental Division is created and a system of 
Environmental Management is put into place in 70% of the centres 
5. An R&D department is set up with the aim of improving 
processes. 
6. Large scale investment in technology. 
7. Deseasonalised products are created 
8.  “Yield management” is implemented in all establishments. 
 
Change of ‘agent’ 
 
Minor change 
 
 
Important 
Actions to improve 
management continue to 
be introduced 
 
2004. Change in 
national 
government. 
Degree of autonomy: 
1.The company can open new establishments independently of 
Turespaña. 
 Control system:  
2. Change of Chairman/CEO and 60% of Board members 
 
System of incentives: 
Continuist policy   
Impact on management policies: 
3. Setting up of a plan of universal access to “Paradores” .  
4. Emphasis put on quality gastronomy and sustainable 
development.  
5. R&D is reinforced 
6. A strong expansion plan is initiated which plans the opening of 
new establishments until 2010 (creating more than 500 jobs). 
7. The offer is segmented in 7 groups: sun and beach, health, 
nature, historical heritage, golf and sport, family and companies. 
Important increase 
 
 
Change of ‘principal’ 
Change of ‘agent’ 
 
No changes 
 
Continuist policy 
Actions which foster 
growth are continued 
 
Table II 
Efficiency measures  and output growth 
   (1)         (2)            (3)                (4)                (5)             (6)            (7) 
Year m 
(%) 
r  
(%) 
TFP (*) t= TFP rate 
of growth 
(%) 
rate of growth of 
firm Revenues 
(%) 
rate of 
growth of 
the Sector 
     (real**) nominal nominal 
1985 0.59 0.38 - -    
1986 7.06 5.78 - - - 25.7 
1987 7.45 7.05 - - - 16.3 
1988 7.24 7.63 - - - 11.8 
1989 7.22 8.41 - - - 11.- 
1990 -0.14 -0.16 - - - 7.6 
1985-1990 
 
79.85 % 
1991 2.62 3.02   - 8.-  
Mean 1985-1990 
sd. 
se. 
4.9 
3.633 
1.4833 
4.85 
3.7733 
1.5404 
- -    
1992 1.03 1.18 1.0104  - 1.2 
1993 -2.82 -3.21 0.983 -2.75 -2.7 0.6 
1994 -2.11 -2.46 0.984 0.10 -1.8 2.8 
1995 2.67 4.56 1.07 8.38 0.5 6.8 
1990-1995 
 
34.76% 
1996 -0.43 -0.74 1.0376 -3.07 1.- 3.7  
Mean 1992-1995 
sd. 
se. 
-0.31 
2.5959 
1.2979 
0.017 
3.5843 
1.7921 
1.01 
0.0408 
0.0204 
1.91 
0.0578 
0.0334 
   
1997 3.46 6.43 1.091 1.94 6.34 11.5 
1998 5.81 11.72 1.122 2.80 13.15 16.- 
1995-1998 
8.9 % 
1999 5.23 10.98 1.097 -2.25 9.2 14.4 27.- % 
2000 10.69 21.77 1.128 2.79 4.4 10.5 -0.7 % 
2001 10.79 19.1 1.112 1.36 -3.9 1.4 4.52 % 
2002 9.53 13.68 1.08 -2.92 -0.8 4.4 n.a. 
2003 11.07 12.14 1.1 1.83 2.15 4.8 n.a. 
2004 11.56 12.70 1.0975 0 7.5 11.9 n.a. 
Mean 1997-2003 
sd. 
se. 
8.08 
3.1575 
1.1934 
13.69 
5.1783 
1.9572 
1.10 
0.01719 
0.0065 
0.8 
0.0237 
0.00897 
   
(*). Not enough data for years before 1991 (neither annual accounts nor management reports exist for 
the company; only the annual budget payment). 
(**) At constant prices.  
Column (7): Source: Own production, from annual figures of added value for the Hotel sector, obtained 
from the Spanish Hotel Federation. 
 
 
Table III 
Relationship organisational changes / efficiency variation 
Change in organisational status I mean before mean after difference  t *, conf. level 
    
m 4.9 -0.3075 -5.2075 2.4589 (***) 
r 4.85 0.0175 -4.8325 2.021 (**) 
Change in organisational status II    
m -0.03075 8.0829 8.11365 -4.4889 (***)
r 0.0175 13.6885 13.671 -4.6335 ***) 
TFP 1.012 1.1043 0.0923 -5.3791 (***)
(*) t-statistic for significance of differences in means from non paired observation sets. 
(**) confidence level over 90%;  (***)confidence level over 95%  
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